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Abstract
We offer a natural and extensible measure-theoretic treatment of miss-
ingness at random. Within the standard missing data framework, we give
a novel characterisation of the observed data as a stopping-set sigma al-
gebra. We demonstrate that the usual missingness at random conditions
are equivalent to requiring particular stochastic processes to be adapted to
a set-indexed filtration of the complete data: measurability conditions that
suffice to ensure the likelihood factorisation necessary for ignorability. Our
rigorous statement of the missing at random conditions also clarifies a com-
mon confusion: what is fixed, and what is random?
Keywords: ignorability; missingness at random; sigma algebra; stochastic pro-
cess.
1 Introduction
Missing at random (Rubin, 1976) is a central concept in missing data research.
Nevertheless, recent papers (Seaman et al., 2013; Mealli & Rubin, 2015; Doretti et al.,
2017) have argued that it remains poorly understood and often inaccurately articu-
lated. The most common formulation (Little & Rubin, 2002, p.12) is superficially
intuitive but misleading in its details; accurate formulations exist (Robins & Gill,
1997) but typically hold little heuristic appeal.
Our ambition here is to provide both rigour and intuition. We show that
the factorization required for ignorability depends on the data-measurability of
the likelihood ratio between two probability measures. The data themselves can
be understood as a stopping-set sigma algebra arising from a particular filtration
of the probability space. We give an explicit characterisation of two families of
probability measures: the first describes the measure assumed to be operating in
practice, while the second is a conditional version of the first under a particular
working independence assumption. We shall show that their likelihood ratio is itself
a stochastic process evaluated at a stopping set, measurable if the underlying
process is adapted. This leads directly to a rigorous definition of missingness
at random, but one that retains the familiarity and simple appeal of the usual
formulation. Along the way, we draw out some deeper connections between missing
data problems and causal inference.
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Rigour is relative. The level of formality we adopt is chosen for clarity in
matters we believe to be most important or least well understood. For example,
we express conditioning statements in terms of sigma algebras, principally to avoid
any confusion over precisely what information is being conditioned upon. The fact
that not only discrete but also continuous or more general random variables can
then be subsumed within our setup is convenient, but secondary.
We tread this path with some trepidation. Rubin describes his own initial
measure-theoretic treatment of missing data as “window dressing”, and then-
Biometrika-editor David Cox’s advice to him was to “eliminate all that measure
theory noise” (Rubin, 2014). We hope that our stochastic process perspective
avoids these pitfalls, and instead succeeds in exposing a real signal that could to
be overlooked following such noise reduction.
2 Notation
Our starting point is a measurable space (Ω,F) on which we define various prob-
ability measures and random variables. We denote probability measures by P
and Q, possibly indexed by a parameter θ in order to describe families of such
measures. We assume that all such probability measures are dominated by a
known reference measure ν: that is, if ν(A) = 0 for some set A ∈ F , then
also P (A) = Q(A) = 0. Following Pollard (2002), we adopt de Finetti nota-
tion: where the context allows it, we interpret a set A as the random variable 1A,
and we re-use the symbol P for its corresponding expectation operator EP . Thus
P (A) = P (1A) = EP (1A) =
∫
1A dP .
The sigma algebra F represents complete information about the entire stochas-
tic system. We think of the information provided by the observed data, too, as a
sigma algebra, and denote it by D. This sigma algebra D should contain all those
events whose logical status is known once the realised values of the observed data
are known. For the time being, we shall remain nebulous about the precise defi-
nition of D but, given the missing data setting, we shall expect D to be a strict
subset of F .
The usual definition of the likelihood function is in terms of the Radon-Nikodym
derivative dPθ/dν: the density of Pθ with respect to a dominating reference mea-
sure ν. This density is a random variable that, for fixed ω ∈ Ω, is to be understood
as a function of θ. However, this random variable is not, in general, D-measurable:
in other words, dPθ/dν is the likelihood based on all information in F , and may
depend on events whose truth or fiction cannot be determined from the observed
data D. Such a quantity is sometimes referred to as the complete data likeli-
hood. By contrast, the observed data likelihood may be conveniently represented
by ν(dPθ/dν | D): given D, the conditional expectation with respect to ν of the
complete data likelihood (Commenges & Gegout-Petit, 2005). This has the intu-
itive appeal of a local average of the complete data density over the area of the
sample space consistent with the observed data. As noted by Chang & Pollard
(1997, p.299), it is also more economical than the standard notation
∫
f dymis,
since no ymis need be introduced.
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3 Ignorability
Missingness at random is fundamentally concerned with ignorability: when can
two families of probability measures be used interchangeably for likelihood-based
inference about θ? We shall make the natural definition and assert that the families
(Pθ) and (Qθ) are everywhere equivalent for inference about θ if, for all θ, θ
′,
ν
(
dPθ
dν
| D
)
ν
(
dPθ′
dν
| D
) = ν
(
dQθ
dν
| D
)
ν
(
dQθ′
dν
| D
)
so that the two likelihood ratios are identical. Here and elsewhere, equality should
be understood almost surely. More simply, writing f and g respectively for the
observed-data likelihood functions based on P and Q, we are making the obvious
assertion that P and Q are equivalent for inference about θ if it is always the case
that
f (θ)
f (θ′)
=
g(θ)
g(θ′)
.
It may happen that everywhere equivalence does not hold, but that the two families
are equivalent on a subset A ∈ D. Formally, (Pθ) and (Qθ) are equivalent on A ∈ D
for inference about θ if, for all θ, θ′,
Aν
(
dPθ
dν
| D
)
Aν
(
dPθ′
dν
| D
) = Aν
(
dQθ
dν
| D
)
Aν
(
dQθ′
dν
| D
) ;
recall that A is to be interpreted here as 1A. This equality ensures that, for any
ω ∈ A, the realized values of likelihood ratios computed under Pθ and Qθ are
identical. We now establish a simple condition under which families of probability
measures are equivalent in this sense.
Lemma 1 The families (Pθ) and (Qθ) are equivalent on A ∈ D for inference
about θ if A × dPθ/dQθ is D-measurable and does not vary with θ. The families
are everywhere equivalent if dPθ/dQθ is D-measurable and does not vary with θ.
The proof is fairly direct: decomposing dPθ/dν as dPθ/dQθ×dQθ/dν, A ∈ D is
brought inside the conditional expectations of the definition and then A×dPθ/dQθ
taken outside since, by assumption, it is D-measurable. More explicitly,
Aν
(
dPθ
dν
| D
)
Aν
(
dPθ′
dν
| D
) =
ν
(
A dPθ
dQθ
dQθ
dν
| D
)
ν
(
A
dPθ′
dQθ′
dQθ′
dν
| D
) = A
dPθ
dQθ
ν
(
dQθ
dν
| D
)
A
dPθ′
dQθ′
ν
(
dQθ′
dν
| D
) = Aν
(
dQθ
dν
| D
)
Aν
(
dQθ′
dν
| D
) ,
where the final cancellation of the two Radon-Nikodym derivatives follows from
the assumption that these do not vary with θ. Taking A = Ω, a trivial corollary
is that (Pθ) and (Qθ) are everywhere equivalent if dPθ/dQθ is D-measurable and
does not vary with θ.
Reducing ignorability to a question about data-measurability of a likelihood
ratio such as dPθ/dQθ is a very general idea. Indeed, to this point, we have made
no mention of missing data, and in fact the theory applies equally well in settings
where the observed data arise in a random fashion but unobserved quantities are
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not thought of as data but simply as latent variables: random effects, for example.
This is the perspective taken by Farewell et al. (2017).
Henceforth we shall suppress dependence on θ, and consider conditions un-
der which the measures P and Q implicitly defined by Rubin (1976) satisfy this
condition for inferential equivalence.
4 Monotone Missing Data
4.1 Data
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we employ the machinery and methods of
stochastic processes. For general missing data, the theory of stochastic processes
indexed by sets will be required (Molchanov, 2006). Here we begin with the
gentler case of monotone missingness, where it suffices to use standard theory
for stochastic processes in discrete time. Unlike other approaches, the stochastic
process perspective permits ideas to be extended from the monotone case to the
general setting with essentially trivial, semantic modifications. Following Rubin
(1976), we let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) be random variables defined on (Ω,F), the ranges
of which may be any measurable spaces. We observe Y1, . . . , YM , where the random
variable M satisfies 0 ≤ M ≤ n; we do not observe YM+1, . . . , Yn. Observation of
the stochastic process Y is terminated at the random time M.
A filtration is a nested family of sigma algebras that, heuristically, captures the
idea of information increase over time. The process Y is adapted to its natural
filtration (Ym), where the sigma algebra Ym = σ(Yi : i ≤ m). Similarly, M is a
stopping time with respect to the filtration (Mm), where Mm = σ({M ≤ i} :
i ≤ m). We define a larger filtration (Fm) by Fm = Ym ∨Mm; this Fm is the
smallest sigma-algebra containing Ym and Mm. For simplicity, we shall assume
that F = Fn, so that there are no measurable events beyond those described
by Y and M. Similarly, we write Y = Yn and M = Mn to describe complete
information about Y , or M, respectively.
Loosely, Fm tells us the values of Y1, . . . , Ym and, through knowledge of the
indicators {M ≤ 1}, . . . , {M ≤ m}, whether or not we have stopped recording
measurements before time m. The observed information increases, F1 ⊆ . . . ⊆
FM , until the random time M, at which point no further information is recorded.
This idea is captured through the elegant definition of the stopping time sigma
algebra FM = {A ∈ F : A∩{M ≤ m} ∈ Fm for all m}. This FM is precisely what
we mean by the observed data sigma algebra D. We contrast our formulation
of D = FM with the alternative D = σ(M, Y1 × {M ≥ 1}, . . . , Yn × {M ≥ n})
which, while technically correct in certain circumstances, is less revealing about
the nature of the observed data. More importantly, though, interpreting D as
a stopping-time sigma algebra provides us with weak and natural conditions for
data-measurability.
4.2 Probability Measures
We write P for the probability measure that we believe gives rise to the data. As
Seaman et al. (2013) point out, P need not actually be the true data generating
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measure; P and Q are models, and ignorability asks whether we can substitute
the simpler model Q for the more complex model P while obtaining identical
inference about θ. We assume that those aspects of P concerned with specifying
the marginal distribution of M are of little scientific interest and, were Y and M
independent, we would happily base our inference on the conditional likelihood of
Y given M, since this really only involves modelling the marginal distribution of Y .
However, we concede that, under P , the random variables Y andM may in fact
have a complicated dependence. Under what conditions can we make a working
assumption of independence between Y and M, use the associated conditional
likelihood, and still draw the same inferences as we would were we to use the full
likelihood given by P?
Specifically, let Q be any probability measure that dominates P , agrees with P
on Y, but under which Y and M are in fact independent. That is, we assume that
P (A) = Q(A) for all A ∈ Y, and that Q(A∩B) = Q(A)Q(B) for any A ∈ Y, B ∈
M. We shall assume that at least one such Q exists; this depends essentially on
(Ω,F) having a suitable product structure. Denote by Q′ : F × Ω → [0, 1] a
regular conditional probability given M that satisfies Q′(A,ω) = Q(A | M)(ω).
Our central question is this: under what conditions are the likelihoods based on P
and Q′ equivalent for inference about θ?
Somewhat less explicitly, this is the question asked by Rubin (1976). We re-
mark that our use of Q′ to characterize a conditional likelihood under a working
independence assumption is slightly different to that of Rubin (1976). Rubin’s
approach is to define the working likelihood through a random probability mea-
sure that varies with M, under which the observed pattern of missing data is
guaranteed to occur. We feel that our definition is more charitable to the miss-
ing data community: a working independence assumption seems more defensible
than a pretense that the observed pattern of missingness was the only possibil-
ity. Another advantage is that our theory can more easily be extended to cases
where the range of M is uncountable; this is not the case for the standard presen-
tation (Commenges & Gegout-Petit, 2005, p.14). In practice, though, the two
approaches are equivalent.
We can be more specific about the relationship between P and Q′. The Radon-
Nikodym derivative dP/dQ is given by λ/µ, where λ and µ are conditional densities
of M given Y under P and Q, respectively. This is an emphatically causal notion
(Pearl, 2009): we replace the conditional distribution of M given Y under P with
an alternative that does not depend on Y, calling the resulting measure Q. The
relationship between Q and Q′ is simpler still: dQ/dQ′ = µ, because under Q
the marginal density of M and the conditional density of M given Y are both µ.
Consequently, dP/dQ′ = dP/dQ × dQ/dQ′ = λ. We deduce that P and Q′ are
equivalent for inference if λ is data-measurable and does not vary with θ.
4.3 Measurability
We have characterized λ, the likelihood ratio between P and Q′, as the conditional
density of M given Y: that is, λ = λM , where for each m, λm = P (M = m | Y).
Looked at another way, λ is the value taken by the stochastic process (λm) at the
random time M.
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This provides a direct route to the question of data measurability or, more
explicitly, FM-measurability. For an (Fm)-stopping time M, standard stochastic
process theory asserts that λM is FM-measurable if the process (λm) is adapted
to the filtration (Fm): adaptedness means that each λm is Fm-measurable. But
since λm = P (M = m | Y) must necessarily be Y-measurable, for it to additionally
be Fm-measurable it must in fact be measurable with respect to (Y ∧ Fm), the
largest sigma algebra contained in both. But Y ∧ Fm = Ym, so in turn we must
have
P (M = m | Y) = P (M = m | Ym) for every m.
This is equivalent to the everywhere version of missingness at random (Seaman et al.,
2013), about which we make several comments. First, its appearance is familiar.
It looks strikingly similar to the ubiquitous, informal definition P (M | Y ) = P (M |
Yobs) (Little & Rubin, 2002), yet its interpretation is rather different: the condi-
tion applies to a sequence of fixed values m, not the random variable M. Second,
its appearance is simple, particularly when contrasted with the rigorous definition
given by Seaman et al. (2013); by conditioning on sub-sigma algebras, we auto-
matically demand that the equality hold for all possible data consistent with the
observed subset Y1, . . . , Ym. Third, it applies equally well to a random variable Y
taking values in uncountable spaces: no conditioning on a set of measure zero
is required. Weaker versions of this condition are possible, which we now briefly
discuss.
4.4 Realised MAR
It is useful to distinguish between everywhere and realised versions of missingness at
random since, for Bayesian or direct-likelihood inference, only the realised likelihood
function is relevant (Doretti et al., 2017). We consider the question of realised
ignorability with reference to the largest set A ∈ D for which Aλ is D-measurable,
which we may define as the union of all sets satisfying this measurability condition.
Although it may have measure zero, this set is never empty: certainly {M =
n} ⊆ A, since the set {M = n} is FM-measurable and the stochastic process
({m = n}λm) is adapted to (Fm), since λn = P (M = n | Y) = P (M = n | Yn)
is a tautology. If ω happens to fall in such a set A, then likelihood inference can
proceed equivalently based on Q′ instead of P .
5 Non-monotone missing data
We turn now to the general case, where there need be no natural ordering of the
Yi : the observations may be obtained simultaneously or in an arbitrary order that
is unknown to the observer. The variables themselves may be of different types:
some binary, some continuous, some multivariate, and any possible subset of the
variables may be observed. Despite this generality, remarkably few notational
changes are needed from the ordered, monotone case: we simply reinterpret what
we have written to this point in terms of stochastic processes indexed by sets
(Molchanov, 2006, p.334). Our subscript i becomes a set, so that if i = {1, 3, 4}
then Yi = (Y1, Y3, Y4). The most important change from the monotone case is
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this: we now understand M as a random subset of {1, . . . , n}, representing the
subset of variables that are observed.
There is, of course, no total ordering of the subsets of {1, . . . , n}, but we
exploit the partial ordering given by set inclusion. That is, we interpret i ≤ m
as i ⊆ m, which describes a lattice on which the stochastic process Y is defined.
Once again, we stop observing Y at the random point M on this lattice, but now
there are potentially multiple routes by which we may arrive at a given point. Just
as before, however, we observe the values of all random variables Yi for which
i ≤ m.
We define Ym = σ(Yi : i ≤ m), Mm = σ({M ≤ i} : i ≤ m) and Fm =
Ym ∨Mm just as before, where now (Fm) is a set-indexed filtration. Again as
before, D = FM, a stopping set sigma algebra. The probability measures P , Q
and Q′ are unaltered in their definitions, and the question of ignorability remains
one of FM-measurability of λ = λM , where λm = P (M = m | Y). The everywhere
missing at random condition, too, is unaltered, and forms our central theorem,
which we now state formally.
Theorem 1 Suppose P (M = m | Y) = P (M = m | Ym) for all m. Let Q ≫ P
agree with P on Y and, under Q, let Y andM be independent. Define Q′ from Q
as a regular conditional probability given M, and let λm = P (M = m | Y). Then
dP/dQ′ = λ = λM is FM-measurable.
The proof is identical to the monotone case: adaptedness of the process (λm)
to the filtration (Fm) and the fact that M is an (Fm)-stopping time ensures
that λ = λM is FM-measurable, as required. Even in this general and unordered
setting, the techniques and intuition of stochastic processes provide us with a
direct proof of data-measurability of the likelihood ratio dP/dQ′. The crucial
point is adaptedness of the stochastic process (λm): ignorability hangs on this
natural condition.
6 Discussion
At least initially, our aim in writing this paper was simply to provide a rigorous re-
interpretation of the usual missingness at random formulation P (M | Y ) = P (M |
Yobs) for those who, like ourselves, worry about such things. We hope that our
version, P (M = m | Y) = P (M = m | Ym), fits this bill and makes clear two
things. First, there is absolutely no information about M contained in either Y
or Ym. Second, the statement varies with different values of m, and so is not a
global statement about the distribution of M.
Missingness at random is thus certainly not a conditional independence re-
quirement (Mealli & Rubin, 2015). To our knowledge, our characterization of
missingness at random as a measurability requirement and, in particular, as an
adaptedness requirement, is novel. The adaptedness condition is sufficient and
nearly necessary: for a stopping time M, a random variable λ is FM-measurable if
and only if there exists an adapted stochastic process (Xm) such that λ = XM , so
minimally λM = XM for some adapted process (Xm). We hope that the adapted-
ness requirement will seem natural to those familiar with the theory of stochastic
processes, within which stochastic observation is very well developed, and with
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which too few connections with missing data have been made. For instance,
the celebrated partial likelihood of survival analysis (Cox, 1975) may be derived
instead as a conditional likelihood under a working independence assumption be-
tween censoring, timings of failures and those individuals selected to fail. Under
weak assumptions about censoring, inference about the regression parameters un-
der the partial likelihood and the full model would be ignorably different but for
the fact that these parameters are shared between both the timing and selection
components of the model. This is a good example of a case where dPθ/dQθ does
in fact vary with θ.
Standard terminology speaks of missing at random ‘mechanisms’. This is
distinctly causal language of which we approve, but the conditional density of M
given Y does not necessarily have a natural causal interpretation: in longitudinal
settings, it seems highly unlikely that future observations, however interpreted,
should be allowed to causally influence the occurrence of previous measurements,
even in principle. Conditional densities along more dynamic filtrations such as
{∅,Ω} = F0 ⊆ F0 ∨ Y1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Fn−1 ⊆ Fn−1 ∨ Yn ⊆ Fn = F could have more
direct causal interpretation, and the relevant likelihood ratio would be a product
of Radon-Nikodym derivatives of regular conditional probabilities, measurable if in
fact the transitions from Fm−1 ∨ Ym to Fm depended only on Fm−1: sequential
missingness at random. Our suspicion is that if we started with a more appropriate
causal model, conditions for ignorability would be more easily assessed, and more
often deemed implausible.
More broadly, the key point remains one of data-measurability of a likelihood
ratio: a very general idea that goes beyond ideas of missing data to encompass par-
tially observed, coarsened or entirely latent stochastic processes (Commenges & Gegout-Petit,
2005). Defining filtrations on these richer spaces designed to have a causal inter-
pretation seems to us a promising approach: among other things, it allows for the
possibility that the thing to be measured can exist without a measurement taking
place (Farewell et al., 2017). Each ω ∈ Ω corresponds to a realisation of an entire
suite of random variables; even for a single individual, there is no particular reason
that their observed Y1 in a realisation in which M = {1} should be the same Y1 as
that from a realisation where M = {1, . . . , n}.
We make use of random sets to extend the theory of monotone missing data
to general patterns of missingness. The lattice structure implicit in this formula-
tion is strongly reminiscent of the randomized monotone missingness mechanisms
of Robins & Gill (1997), wherein future observation can depend on previous mea-
surements within the history of a particular branch. We believe, but have not
proved, that the distinction between randomized monotone missingness and gen-
eral missingness at random lies in the existence of incomparable sets m,m′, for
which neither m ≤ m′ nor m′ ≤ m.
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